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If we define “good” to be each agent getting their top choice, then it is unclear, as we can only observe a binary view of preferences rather than rank-order preferences.

However, if we define it to be a “stable” matching, then evidence suggests that these are actually pretty good matchings.

However, as more users join “their side”, users’ utility decreases due to higher competition, and this is a same-side negative effect.

Similarly, the users are also not told how many other users are on “their side”, and withholding this information hides the true severity of competition in the market.This idea of currency itself is dynamic as it is a function of both the individual’s attributes and the potential partners’ preferences.Hence, an agent may have high currency or desirability for one person and low desirability for another, and the preferences may not necessarily be monotonically related to their attributes.This makes matching in the market quite interesting as individual preferences are likely to be heterogenous.Efficient matching in this market thus relies on the existence of pairs of mutually desirable agents in a setting where all preferences are heterogenously distributed.

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